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If one values freedom, tolerance, and civil liberties, we live ata time when our planet is a dangerous place.  Even if oneaccepts the notion that mankind is composed of decent and
good human beings, not all societies place a premium on the
values of freedom, tolerance, and civil liberties for all.  While
there are many factors that promote justice, judicial indepen-
dence is the cornerstone to freedom and liberty.  Now more
than at other times in history, a strong, effective, and indepen-
dent judiciary is imperative.  Now more than ever, judges need
to realize that maintaining an impartial independent judiciary
is their responsibility.
In the eighteenth century, Montesquieu noted that a resolute
judiciary is the only check on the executive branch, because it
is the only protection a citizen has of their civil rights.
Montesquieu thought judicial independence was the most
important safeguard in our system of government to protect
individual rights, including life, liberty, and property.  Similarly,
Alexander Hamilton argued that “the complete independence
of the courts is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution,”
noting “that the courts were designed to be an intermediate
body between the people and the legislature, in order, among
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to
their authority.”1 He concluded that an independent judiciary
was “an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill
humors in the society” that lead to the enactment of “unjust
and partial laws.”2
Historians agree that judicial independence, newly estab-
lished in the United States, was firmly secured in 1803 when
Chief Justice Marshall wrote, in Marbury v. Madison,3 “It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is.”  He continued by quoting the oath of
office for a judge:
I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice with-
out respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor
and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially
discharge all the duties incumbent on me as according
to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably
to the constitution, and laws of the United States.4
Although his leadership and opinion in Marbury was at the
time controversial, Marshall provides today’s judicial leaders a
model as to how courts should do what is right and just, even
if it is unpopular and not politically advisable.
Most of today’s discussions about judicial independence
center on the degree to which a court may freely adjudicate
cases without outside pressures impacting the decisions.  For
the judges of many state courts, the most obvious source of
pressure is the electorate. However, while there are gross abuses
in the electoral process that infringe on judicial independence
for most of the nearly 28,000 state and municipal judges, there
is less of a threat from the electorate than many would like to
concede.  Judicial independence is not absolute independence.
Judicial independence is a means to an end, not an end in itself.
Judges should function to promote democracy and civil rights,
but cannot easily maintain their role as independent and
impartial arbitrators if they are isolated from answering to any-
one.  Communities have a right to expect that courts will not
just be independent, but fair, impartial, and effective in dealing
with the problems that confront them as well.  
Problem-solving courts are part of the way to be more effec-
tive.  Problem-solving courts need not be a threat to fairness
and impartiality, but they can be.  Some have argued that prob-
lem-solving courts place judges in untenable positions that
undermine judicial independence.  They argue that due process
requires that judges must refrain from any role other than that
of neutral arbiter, listening to two (or more) sides presenting an
issue and then deciding between them.  They argue that it is
impossible for judges to do more—that you can have due
process or you can have a problem-solving judge, but that you
cannot have both.  False choices like this represent a tyranny of
limited thought and an unnecessary limit on the ability of
judges to perform the work today’s society and its problems
require.  
Judicial independence is easily understood and accepted
when a judge acts in the traditional role of judge as a neutral,
impartial decision maker.  However, when problem-solving
courts were created a century ago, innovative judges and court
personnel redefined the role of the court and the judge.  Today
it is worth asking, what if the threat to judicial independence
and impartiality is not external?  What if the threat is from
well-meaning and well-intentioned members of the judiciary or
traditional allies of judicial independence?
The original problem-solving court, a juvenile court, was
created a century ago in Chicago, and within 25 years the con-
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cept had spread nationwide.  When these juvenile courts orig-
inated, a primary goal was rehabilitation.  Children are our
future and the impetus for the creation of the juvenile court
was the promise that courts could surely do better with our
future than the courts were doing at the time.  The original
juvenile court was to determine and cure the juvenile’s prob-
lem.  To reach its goal, the court had to determine “what [the
juvenile] is, how has he become what he is, and what had best
be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save
him from a downward career.”5 Ideally, each disposition was to
be customized to fit the child, such that the child would grow
into a productive, useful adult citizen and put the errors of his
youth behind him.
To distinguish this original problem-solving court from the
other courts of the time, the founders used different terminol-
ogy from that used in criminal court in an effort to clearly dis-
tinguish the two courts.  Accordingly, a juvenile was a delin-
quent, not a criminal, and was adjudicated, not found guilty.  A
juvenile was held in detention, not jail, and if it was long-term,
it was a “school,” “camp,” or “program” where the juvenile
stayed, but not a prison.  A juvenile was not sentenced, but
committed.  
As Shakespeare wrote, “What’s in a name? That which we
call a rose by any other word would smell as sweet.”6 While the
juvenile court founders intended the vocabulary to distinguish
juvenile court, words are not what distinguish the court.  The
founders’ theory only works if the “schools” and “camps” actu-
ally treat the child and are not just words masking punishment
or prison.
In the original juvenile courts, the role of the judge was dif-
ferent from a traditional judge.  Ideally, it was thought that the
juvenile judge would not focus solely on guilt or innocence but
on what forces and events in the child’s life combined to bring
the child to appear before the judge.  An early description of
the ideal juvenile court judge was a concerned parent, psychi-
atrist, and social worker wrapped up in a black robe who could
guide a youth away from a negative life.  
The early juvenile courts disregarded some of the estab-
lished rules of law and the constitution by “rethinking” con-
cepts of due process and creating new rules of evidence pecu-
liar to the juvenile court.  The court’s founders believed that
due process and some rules of evidence made it more difficult,
if not impossible, to focus solely on what the child’s best inter-
ests were.  The original juvenile courts even discouraged the
presence of lawyers as they would only add a burden to the
court by introducing technicalities.
In making the decision to turn away from the fundamental
constitutional principles to which every adult defendant had a
right, juvenile courts felt that these rights were not in the
child’s best interest, since it was thought that the rights limited
the judge’s ability to do what was best for the child.  No doubt
the founders of the original juvenile courts had good inten-
tions, but the concept removed an important check of the exec-
utive and legislative branches by removing the judicial safe-
guard that by design was to pro-
tect individual rights.  This ero-
sion of judicial impartiality and
independence came from
within the judicial branch, not
from external forces as
Montesquieu and Hamilton had
feared might happen, but the
effect was just as destructive.
Juvenile courts have helped
millions of children.  They were a good idea when they were
founded and remain so today.  Over time, juvenile courts rec-
ognized that juveniles were entitled to their constitutional
rights and that ignoring one’s constitutional rights is not in
anyone’s best interest.  In holding that juveniles are entitled to
the same constitutional rights as adults, Justice Fortas said in In
re Gault:
The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar
system is—to say the least—debatable. . . . Juvenile
court history has again demonstrated that unbridled
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is fre-
quently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.
In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: “The powers of the Star
Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of your
juvenile courts. . . .” The absence of substantive stan-
dards has not necessarily meant that children receive
careful, compassionate, individualized treatment.  The
absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional
principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and
effective procedures.  Departures from established prin-
ciples of due process have frequently resulted not in
enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.7
As with any innovative idea, there is a period of struggle to
figure out what works best.  Post-Gault, the rules of evidence
and due process were introduced back into juvenile court, and
throughout the nation, lawyers, albeit frequently overworked,
are present to represent the juveniles.  The judge as a compas-
sionate and caring parental substitute is still a model.  However,
judges who work in juvenile court must work to also maintain
judicial fairness, impartiality, and effectiveness.
For decades, juvenile court was the only specialized prob-
lem-solving court, but today many people realize that problem-
solving courts are beneficial in that they allow judges to focus
on similar types of cases and defendants.  As a result, more
problem-solving courts, including drug, domestic abuse, com-
munity, and mental-health courts, have been created.
Drug court developed in response to the increase in drug
crimes and the judiciary recognizing that the addictions of
many of the defendants controlled their actions.  The first rec-
ognized drug court opened in Miami in 1989.  In the 15 years
since it opened 1,470 additional drug courts have been created
across the United States.  While there are wide differences in
the program details of these courts, the goal of drug courts is
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simple—to strengthen supervision of defendants participating
in drug treatment programs, to reduce recidivism, to build pro-
ductive citizens, and to save prison space for violent offenders.
Just as with the invention of the juvenile court, however, many
of the proponents of drug courts designed these courts by
“redefining” concepts of evidence, the role of lawyers, and due
process.  Many of the early proponents of drug courts thought
that the adversary process itself threatened the effectiveness of
their courts.
It is very conservatively estimated that 16% of the nation’s
prison population have serious mental illnesses.  Many believe
that a more accurate estimate is nearly 35%.  Any judge who
sits on an arraignment calendar in a major city knows the prob-
lem—the laudable goal of deinstitutionalization of the mentally
ill swept too many into the criminal justice system.  With the
success generated by many drug courts, problem-solving courts
have begun to deal with mentally ill offenders through mental-
health courts. In mental-health court, the objective is to help
the defendant receive proper treatment rather than simply a jail
or prison sentence.  Just as with the drug and juvenile problem-
solving courts, one of the judge’s roles is to balance the needs
of the defendant against the needs of his or her family, while
always remembering to consider public safety.    
Like the founders of juvenile court, frequently the founders
of new drug, mental-health, or other problem-solving courts
believe that the defendants in these courts should not be “con-
fined by the concept of justice alone.”  Regrettably, it is argued
that there is a conflict between the goals of the problem-solv-
ing courts and constitutional rights of due process.
The challenge for all problem-solving courts is balancing the
role of the judiciary.  An important lesson learned from the
early juvenile courts is that a judge cannot abandon his or her
neutral role in the justice process, no matter how noble the
cause.  The judge can become a partner with the key players in
the problem-solving courts, but there is a tyranny of the “or”
that presents a severe threat to problem-solving courts.  The
tyranny of the “or” poses the choice as treatment for addiction
or surrendering a defendant’s right to due process. Treatment or
surrendering your right to due process are not choices that are
necessary, but rather represent the evil created by the tyranny
of the “or.”  The tyranny of the “or” is a viral poison that lim-
its the possibility of problem-solving courts as an accepted
approach to more universally dealing with the problems con-
fronting the nation’s courts.  More importantly, the tyranny is a
viral poison that can undermine judicial independence, fair-
ness, and impartiality.
Every judge, regardless of assignment, struggles to find the
balance between neutrality and caring, but this is especially
important in problem-solving courts.  In the context of the
problem-solving court, the judge’s role is not the typical role of
referee between two adversaries, but rather a judge is a ship’s
captain, directing the course of the ship or the court.  Steering
a ship during the storms that becloud the justice system is not
an easy task.
The answers to the balance between appropriate interdepen-
dence and abandoning neutrality are never clear cut.
Minnesota Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz has championed the
Children’s Justice Initiative (CJI).  CJI is a project to shift the
focus of the child-protection system to better serve the child.  It
focuses on a safe, stable, and permanent place for the child in
a nurturing family.  To achieve this, CJI revolves around child-
centered decision making, while protecting the due process of
all parties, recognizing cultural and social differences, and
holding the system accountable.  A century after the creation of
juvenile court and a quarter century after the growth of prob-
lem-solving courts, CJI is setting goals and beginning to mea-
sure performance in juvenile court.  For example, CJI has a goal
that “proceedings are conducted in a fair manner with strong
judicial oversight.”  The table found in Figure 1 illustrates how
this goal is measured by CJI.
It is possible to measure the effectiveness of problem-solving
courts in part by measuring tangible outcomes, such as the
response time of the court, the timeliness of the proceedings,
and the sufficiency of representation.  These are important and
easily ascertainable data that do in part explain a court’s per-
formance.  However, the performance measures need to go a
step further.  Problem-solving courts need to ask such ques-
tions as:  Is the court perceived as being fair to litigants and
other constituents?  Do litigants perceive they are being lis-
tened to?  Do litigants understand the orders given by the
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FIGURE 1: MINNESOTA CHILDREN’S JUSTICE INITIATIVE
STANDARD MEASURE 2002 2003
Guardian ad litem (GAL) is assigned on all cases Percent of children appointed or assigned a GAL 88% 91.6%
Adjudication or dismissal occurs within 
60 days of the first hearing
Average number of days between first hearing 
and adjudication
94.8 96.2
Percent of children for whom adjudication 
occurred within 60 days of first hearing
56.1% 52.8%
In-court review hearings are held at least 
every 90 days
Average number of days between disposition 
and first in-court review hearing
128.1 84.5
Percent of children for whom first in-court review
hearing occurred within 90 days of disposition
56.7% 68.4%
       
court?  All courts, regardless of whether they view themselves
as problem solving or not, enhance their independence if they
are held accountable for their answers to these questions.  The
best strategy for problem-solving courts to minimize the risk
that the tyranny of the “or” presents is to adopt these types of
performance measures.
One of the unfortunate side effects of urbanization is the dis-
connect that can occur between government and the governed.
Courts in an urban setting, like other parts of government, can
lose their connection to the problems facing the community.
The result is not just a lack of effectiveness but the erosion of
public trust and confidence that courts need in order to thrive.
Problem-solving courts need not be specialized dockets, but
can also be a court’s global response to a beleaguered commu-
nity’s problems.  Community court is a problem-solving court,
but one that presents yet another challenge for judicial inde-
pendence.  The issue for community court is not just to main-
tain the commitment to individual litigants’ right to an inde-
pendent, fair, and due-process-oriented court.  The issue for the
community court is the community connection itself.
Perhaps the most notable example of a successful commu-
nity court is the Red Hook Community Justice Center in
Brooklyn.8 About a decade ago, a multi-jurisdictional court
was created that combined criminal, civil, and family matters
that arose from the police precincts in the neighborhoods.
Benefits of this court include community service directly in the
community for small-time offenders, and the public is much
more aware of what the penalties are for the worst offenders.
Since this problem-solving court opened, crime in the Red
Hook District has decreased 60%.  The presence of the prob-
lem-solving court in the community in which the problems
arise increases the community feeling safe in their own homes,
as well as feeling that there is meaningful access to justice in an
urban setting for non-criminal matters.  Community confi-
dence may be a less tangible measurement of the effectiveness
of problem-solving courts than the specialized version of case-
type courts, but the results are just as important.
There is no reason to fear community court.  In fact, judicial
independence, fairness, and effectiveness can be strengthened
through appropriate interdependence with the community and
other branches of government.  The success of a problem-solv-
ing court like the community court in the Red Hook District of
Brooklyn demonstrates that the judges are far more effective
when they are aware of the problems and of the successes in the
community and resources that can be assembled to assist the
court.  The community court in Red Hook is successful in large
part because of an open, visible working relationship between
the community and the justice system.  There is benefit that
flows from restorative justice initiatives that involve the com-
munity beyond the positive impact on any particular defen-
dant.  Public trust and confidence in the judicial branch is
enhanced if the community sees
that judges care.  Judges who are
familiar with the community are
better able to customize the pun-
ishment to the crime and the
offender.  This in turn allows the
community to see justice in
action and government being
responsive.
Traditions of judicial neutral-
ity and detachment are bedrock;
however, if judges wear blinders that shield them from seeing
the resources and outcomes of courts, they cannot be effective
in modern society.  Unfortunately, that is exactly what some
judicial ethicists and traditional allies of judicial independence
want from their judges—neutrality to the point of isolation
from becoming familiar or working with the resources of the
problem-solving court.
States have different traditions about the appropriate collab-
oration of the judiciary with the community or the executive
and legislative branches.  Programs such as Minnesota’s
Children Justice Institute and the Red Hook Community Court
encourage judges to work with organizations that may have an
interest in a case outcome.   Collaboration to effect systemwide
improvement is the mantra of those involved in problem-solv-
ing courts.  Sometimes the mantra can be misunderstood.
Some attempts to limit a judge’s activities outside the court-
room simply undermine the potential of courts to appropriately
work with the community.
In Texas recently, a family-court judge was criticized and
alleged to have committed misconduct when his impartiality
was called into question because he was a board member for a
local child-protection organization.  The family-court judge
must rule on whether a child should be removed from his or
her parents and placed in state custody.  Therefore, in the
minds of some Texas commentators, the alleged misconduct
occurred because the family-court judge’s position on boards
could impact his ultimate rulings on custody cases.  
The role of a judge is changing.  While there are always rea-
sons for judicial leaders to be cautious about change, particu-
larly when it comes to ethical rules, it is proper and necessary
for a judge to be active in policy formation in virtually every
problem-solving court.  Judicial codes are perfectly under-
standable when they prevent judges from creating personal
conflicts of interest by serving on boards that may appear
before them in court.  The line of demarcation is more difficult
to ascertain when the court itself is designed to foster a new
relationship between the judiciary and the community.  The
approach advocated by some in Texas and, to be fair to Texas,
in other jurisdictions, is yet another variation on the tyranny of
the “or.”  It’s just as viral and just as destructive.  Collaboration
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and interdependence with others or impartiality and fairness
are not mutually exclusive.
Judges are in a unique position to serve as a mechanism for
reform outside of the courtroom.  Judicial canons support and
even encourage this role.  In 2002, in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White,9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a judicial
canon preventing judicial candidates from speaking regarding
disputed legal and political issues was a violation of the First
Amendment.  White is viewed by many in the judicial commu-
nity as undermining judicial independence.  Viewed in another
light, the case stands for a broader point that enables problem-
solving judges to make the administration of justice more effec-
tive.  In delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice Scalia noted that
judges are not only permitted, but are encouraged to state their
opinions outside the context of adjudication on disputed issues
in forums such as classrooms, books, and speeches.10 Being
appointed or elected to the bench does not create a cone of
silence that may only be lifted when issuing orders in the court-
room.  
In New York’s 2004 state of the judiciary speech,11 Chief
Justice Judith Kaye quoted a line from an editorial, which
stated, “Being a judge should be a source of pride, not patron-
age.”12 She continued:
It is indeed a privilege—the greatest privilege imagin-
able—to sit in judgment on fellow human beings, to
review challenged acts of government, to declare jus-
tice. Judges, above all, feel it.  With privilege, of
course, comes the heavy responsibility to make good
decisions in individual cases, to treat people with dig-
nity and sensitivity, and to safeguard the efficacy and
integrity of the process.13
Judges speaking out should come not only when they see a
way to improve things, but when changes have worked.  Such
as the judge from upstate New York, who wrote to Chief Justice
Kaye:
“I for one single-handedly attest to the revolution in
the criminal justice system with the advent of the drug
treatment court and domestic violence court.  Today,
we do it a lot better than it was done yesterday. . . .  I
am a local judge positively affecting the lives of many
people in my community.  A great blessing I cherish.”14
Not every judge is comfortable advocating for change.  Not
every judge necessarily has the skills to be good at that type of
advocacy and system change.  Some other judges believe it is
not their role to speak out about problems with how the men-
tally ill or drug addicted are treated in court.  These judges are
sincere and care about the problems.  Those attitudes present
the final tyranny of the “or” that problem-solving courts face.
Either you are an advocate for problem solving or an out-of-
touch mechanical jurist.
Problem-solving courts and the judges who preside in them
must be able to be innovative and outspoken about how to deal
with the litigants in these courts.  To advance their cause, they
need to make converts of many of their judicial colleagues.
What made nearly all of the early problem-solving courts effec-
tive was not just the bells and whistles of the courts, but an atti-
tude in everyone in the courtroom that the judiciary cared and
the judiciary listened.  All judges will enhance this discussion
if they resist the tyranny of the “or.”  The tyranny of the “or” is
the true threat to judicial independence, not problem-solving
courts.
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